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Abstract
Recent research in neuroeconomics suggests that the same brain areas that gen-
erate emotional states are also involved in the processing of information about risk,
rewards and punishments. These findings imply that emotions may influence finan-
cial decisions in a predictable and parsimonious way. Our evidence suggests that
affect – generated either by exogenous manipulations, or endogenously by outcomes
of prior actions – indeed matters for financial risk taking, and that it does so by
changing preferences as well as the belief formation process. Positive and arousing
emotional states such as excitement induce people to take more risk, and to be
more confident in their ability to evaluate the available investment options, rela-
tive to neutral states, while negative emotions such as anxiety have the opposite
effects. Moreover, beliefs are updated in a way that is consistent with the self-
preservation motive of maintaining positive affect and avoiding negative affect, by
not fully taking into account new information that is at odds with the individuals’
prior choices. Therefore, characteristics of markets, economic policies or organiza-
tion design that have an impact on emotional brain circuits may influence decision
making and affect important outcomes at the individual and aggregate level.
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I. Introduction
Recent work in economics (Elster (1998), Caplin and Leahy (2001)) has proposed that
emotions may play a role in decision making under risk, following a significant stream of
work in the psychology literature (Loewenstein et al. (2001)). The evidence gathered so
far is supportive of this claim. For instance, environmental factors that have been shown
to influence people’s mood seem to correlate with stock market returns (Saunders (1993),
Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003)). Moreover, investing itself is an activity that induces
strong emotional responses, even when the individuals involved are professional traders
(Lo and Repin (2002)). These empirical findings, however, do not allow us to distinguish
whether emotions impact behavior by changing risk preferences, or the belief formation
process, or both.
A microfoundation for these effects has started to emerge from the neuroscience liter-
ature. It has been shown that parts of the brain that generate emotional states and help
guide behavior in primitive circumstances (such as seeking food or avoiding predators)
are also important for the processing of information about monetary rewards, punish-
ments, as well as risk. These brain areas are present in all mammals, and are referred
to as the brain’s limbic system. The role of this old (in an evolutionary sense) system
is to allow the organism to react quickly to cues or changes in the environment that are
important for survival.
Two components of this system in particular have been found to be engaged in de-
cision making under risk: the nucleus accumbens and the anterior insula. The nucleus
accumbens is crucial for the processing of information about gains or rewards, and for mo-
tivating the individual to approach potentially rewarding cues in the environment(Breiter
et al. (2001), Knutson et al. (2001)). Activation in this structure has been associated
with experiencing a state of excitement, also referred to as positive arousal (Bjork et al.
(2004)). The anterior insula has been implicated in the processing of information about
losses or punishments, and in the avoidance of aversive cues, and its activation leads to
experiencing states of anxiety, also referred to as negative arousal (Chua et al. (1999),
Simmons et al. (2004)). Moreover, activation in these two structures encodes information
about the risk entailed by available choices (Preuschoff et al. (2006), Preuschoff et al.
(2008)).
Prior work has shown that activation in these two areas helps predict whether indi-
viduals choose risky or riskless investment opportunities, even after controlling for the
effect of informational and wealth-related variables that should be the determinants of
this choice. Specifically, higher activation in the nucleus accumbens is associated with
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a higher likelihood of switching to risky assets, while higher activation in the anterior
insula is associated with switching to holding riskless assets. Excessive activation in these
brain areas is followed by taking on too much or too little risk relative to the optimal
choice of an expected utility maximizing, Bayesian updating agent (Kuhnen and Knutson
(2005)). The relationship between activation in these emotional areas of the brain and
the riskiness of the chosen investments seems to be causal. Exogenously increasing the
nucleus accumbens activation (by presenting non-monetary visual stimuli characterized
by strong positive affect) before a financial decision causes the subjects to make riskier
investments (Knutson et al. (2008)).
The goal of this paper is two-fold. First, we would like to find whether emotions change
financial choices by modifying risk preferences, or beliefs, or both. In our experimental
setting, we observe financial choices and also elicit subjective beliefs about the payoffs
of the available investments. Changes in affective states are either induced exogenously,
or are the result of the investing activity itself. Second, we propose a parsimonious
framework for explaining multiple types of deviations from rational choice, or behavioral
biases. We build this framework on the existing results regarding the role of the brain’s
limbic system on decision making.
Our main insight is that emotions matter for decision making under risk, whether they
are caused by exogenous factors or induced by outcomes of past choices. In particular,
we argue that two emotional states, excitement (or positive arousal) and anxiety (or
negative arousal), impact our risk preferences and the way we learn.
The psychology literature has shown that feedback about outcomes of past choices
generates strong affective reactions, which in turn “have automatic and pervasive effects
on performance even on tasks other than the one that induced the affect” (Kluger and
DeNisi (1996)). Moreover, neuroscience findings point to the limbic system as being
the source of these reactions. Specifically in the context of feedback about decisions
under risk, it has been shown that activation in the nucleus accumbens increases when
we learn that the outcome of a past choice was better than expected (Delgado et al.
(2000), Pessiglione et al. (2006)).1 Activation in the anterior insula increases when the
outcome is worse than expected (Seymour et al. (2004), Pessiglione et al. (2006)), and
when actions not chosen have larger payoffs than the chosen one (Kuhnen and Knutson
1The neurotransmitter responsible for these reactions to rewards is dopamine. See Schultz (2007)
for a review of the neuroscience literature on the role of dopamine in learning, and Bernheim and
Rangel (2004) and Caplin and Dean (2008) for theoretical models of choice based on the properties
of the dopamine system. Whether or not another neurotransmitter is responsible with learning from
punishments (or unexpected losses) is still debated. One possible candidate for this role is serotonin
(Daw et al. (2002)).
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(2005)). Importantly, the increase in activation in these areas is positively correlated with
the size of the surprise associated with the outcome, also referred to as the prediction
error, suggesting that learning is dependent on the brain’s limbic system.
We build on these prior findings by proposing that emotions such as excitement and
anxiety – or equivalently, changes in activation of the nucleus accumbens and of the
anterior insula – modify risk preferences, as well as the learning process itself.
First, we hypothesize that risk aversion is diminished by excitement, and increased by
anxiety, consistent with evidence from Loewenstein et al. (2001), Kuhnen and Knutson
(2005) and Knutson et al. (2008). The results in Knutson et al. (2008) suggest that
nucleus accumbens activation modulates risk preferences. In that experiment, subjects
knew the probability distributions of the outcomes of the two risky lotteries they could
choose from, and thus their beliefs were fixed. Hence, shifts in risk taking behavior that
followed the exogenous affect manipulation – switching from the low risk to the high risk
lottery — could not be attributed to changes in beliefs about the probability distribution
of outcomes, but rather to a change in risk preferences. In the current paper we find
that, controlling for beliefs, the propensity to take risks is increased by positive affect
and decreased by negative affect, as predicted.
Second, we hypothesize that beliefs are formed in accordance with the current emo-
tional state, which is generated either by exogenous manipulations, or by outcomes of
past choices. For instance, the learning process will differ if an individual experiences a
high or a low outcome, one that is better or worse than that of other investments (or
actions) not chosen, or if the outcome is confirming or disconfirming of prior choices.
These events generate either excitement or anxiety, respectively, by triggering activation
in the limbic system, and influence the encoding of the new information conveyed by
the event. Since the limbic system allows the individual to engage in self-preservation
behaviors (such as approaching food, or avoiding predators) it is possible that beliefs
are formed with the same self-preservation motive. Specifically, the limbic system may
generate beliefs strategically, in order to maintain positive affect or avoid negative affect.
This is akin to selecting beliefs in order to eliminate cognitive dissonance (see Akerlof
and Dickens (1982)). We find that the belief updating process indeed depends on how
new information matches with prior beliefs and choices. People do not fully incorporate
news about investment options that seem to be at odds with their prior actions. We also
find that events that generate positive affect, such as instances where new information
matches the subjects’ prior choices, lead them to be more confident in their ability to
identify the quality of the available investment options.
These findings suggest that affect can influence financial risk taking when feedback
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and updating are involved. The influence of feedback has been suggested by prior findings
related to the phenomenon of myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler (1995)), in which
people take less financial risk if they know that they will receive more frequent feedback
about their investment outcomes. Gneezy and Potters (1997) validate this phenomenon in
an experimental setting and conjecture that when investors expect less frequent feedback
they anticipate fewer opportunities to experience losses, and thus are more willing to
make risky investments in advance. This conjecture is consistent with the notion that
emotion plays a role in risk taking, and that an absence of future feedback allows a more
positive affective state prior to choice.
Affect has also been linked to learning, or the updating of beliefs. Charness and Levin
(2005) argue that in situations when reinforcement strategies (i.e. rules-of-thumb such as
the “win-stay / lose-shift” heuristic2) compete with Bayesian updating strategies, people
are more likely to make choices according to reinforcement strategies. They test this hy-
pothesis in an experimental setting, and find strong evidence to support it. Importantly,
the authors also find that if the subjects’ pay does not depend on the outcome of their
choices, they are more likely to adopt Bayesian updating strategies and less likely to use
the rule-of-thumb reinforcement strategies. One can interpret these findings as indicating
that removing affective input from feedback (i.e. not paying the subjects based on the
outcome of their choice) helps people behave in a more rational way.
The present findings also contribute to the literature focusing on the link between
mood and stock returns (Saunders (1993), Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003)), between
overconfidence and trading (Barber and Odean (2000), Gervais and Odean (2001), Grin-
blatt and Keloharju (2006)), and between overconfidence and managerial decisions (Heaton
(2002), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Gervais et al. (2005), Ben-David et al. (2007)) by
suggesting that affect (exogenous or generated by past outcomes) may be the source of
patterns in financial choices that have been documented in this prior work.
II. Experimental Design
To examine whether exogenous and endogenous affect impacts beliefs, preferences or
both during decision making under risk, we designed the Beliefs Task, in which sub-
jects repeatedly chose to invest in a risky or a riskless security while learning about the
2This heuristic refers to the tendency to repeat actions that have been successful and avoid those
that were not, irrespective of the implications of past outcomes for the optimal strategy going forward.
If, for instance, past choices are rewarding but at the same time they deplete the source of the reward
(e.g. picking fruit from a tree), an individual acting according to reinforcement learning would not even
consider the fact that he has already depleted that resource.
4
distribution of payoffs of the risky security.
Before each choice, subjects saw a geometric shape followed by a picture. The shape
and picture had no connection to the investment choices faced by the subject. Pictures
belonged to three different categories: highly arousing and positive (e.g. erotic scenes),
highly arousing and negative (e.g. rotten food), and neutral (e.g. a book sitting on the
floor). Subjects were instructed to pay attention to the pictures because they would be
asked questions about them after the investment task was over. Each geometric shape was
associated with one type of picture. A square was always followed by a positive picture,
a circle was always followed by a neutral picture, and a triangle was always followed by a
negative picture. Presenting these geometric shapes before the actual pictures increases
the anticipatory affect, since subjects know which type if image to expect before they
actually see it.
After making all the investment decisions, subjects were asked to rate the pictures
on arousal and valence dimensions. Arousal was measured on a scale from 1 to 9, while
valence was measured on a scale from -4 to 4. The arousal scale measures how aroused
or activated people feel at a given time. At the far right on this scale, individuals are
feeling very aroused, activated, charged or energized, physically or mentally. At the
far left, people are feeling completely unaroused, slow, still, deenergized, physically and
mentally. The valence scale measures how positive or negative people are feeling. At the
far left people are feeling very negative: unhappy, upset, irritated, frustrated, angry, sad,
fearful or depressed. At the far right people are feeling very positive: happy, pleased,
satisfied, competent, proud, content or delighted. In the middle of this scale people are
feeling completely neutral, neither positive or negative.
Figure 2 shows that subjects rated positive pictures as being more positive and arous-
ing than neutral pictures, and negative pictures as being more negative and arousing than
neutral pictures (p < 0.001). Thus, the exogenous visual cues induced the desired affec-
tive state.
Moreover, we infer that the presentation of positive pictures increased nucleus accum-
bens activation, while the presentation of negative pictures increased insula activation,
based on prior evidence that nucleus accumbens activation correlates with the positive
arousal rating that subjects assign to cues (Bjork et al. (2004), Martinez et al. (2003)),
and that anterior insula activation correlates with negative arousal ratings (Paulus et al.
(2003), Simmons et al. (2004)).
28 subjects (14 male) were recruited via email announcements to the Kellogg School of
Management subject pool and by posting fliers on the Northwestern University campus.
The instructions given to subjects are contained in the appendix. All participants signed
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informed consent forms before doing the experiments, as required by the Institutional
Review Board at Northwestern University.
The experiment took 1.5 hours to complete and the average pay per subject was
$24.91. The task contained 90 trials, during which subjects had to decide whether to
invest in a risky security (stock) or in a riskless security (bond). The timeline of one such
trial is shown in Figure 1.
On any trial, if subjects chose to invest in the bond, they would get $3 for sure at the
end of the trial. If they chose to invest in the stock, they would receive a dividend which
was either $10 or -$10. The stock could be paying these dividends according to one of
two probability distributions, one of which was better than the other, in the sense of first-
order stochastic dominance. If the stock was “good” then the probability of receiving
the $10 dividend was 75% and the probability of receiving the -$10 dividend was 25%. If
the stock was “bad” then the probability of receiving the $10 dividend was 25% and the
probability of receiving the -$10 dividend was 75%. At the beginning of each block of
five trials, the computer selected at random which type of stock the subject would face.
The dividends paid by the stock were independent from trial to trial, but were drawn
from the same distribution during all five trials in each block.
Subjects saw the dividend paid by the stock, whether they chose the stock or the
bond in a particular trial. After making the choice between the two assets and learning
the dividend paid by the stock, at the end of each trial subjects were asked two questions:
(1) “What you think is the probability that the stock is the good one?”
(2) “How much you trust your ability to come up with the correct probability estimate
that the stock is good?”
At the end of the investment task, we added $1 to the subjects’ earnings for every
time they provided us with a probability estimate that was within 5% of the correct value
(for example, that happened if the correct probability was 80% and the subject’s answer
was between 75% and 85%). During the task, however, no feedback was provided about
the accuracy of the probability estimates elicited from participants.
Throughout the task, subjects were informed how much money they had accumulated
through dividends paid by the assets chosen up to that point. The final pay was calculated
as the sum of a $15 show-up fee and one twentieth of the task earnings, where task
earnings included the dividends accumulated through investing in the two assets and the
amount earned by providing accurate probability estimates.
All this information was known by subjects before the experiment started. The only
thing that participants did not know was which type of stock they would encounter at
the beginning of each block of five trials.
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III. Results
A. Affect and choice
The evidence we find is consistent with the hypothesis that exogenous and endogenous
affect cues can change risk taking behavior, in line with our predictions.
On average, after subjects saw a negative picture, they were less likely to choose the
risky asset relative to trials when neutral pictures were shown (see Figure 3). The fraction
of trials when the risky asset was chosen was 0.36 when negative cues were presented,
0.41 when the neutral cues were presented, and 0.40 when positive cues were presented.
Mean comparison tests between the fraction of times people made the risky investment
when exposed to negative versus positive cues, or negative versus neutral cues, indicate
a significantly reduced likelihood of choosing the stock in the negative cue condition
(p < 0.05). However, overall, subjects were not more likely to choose the risky asset after
seeing a positive picture relative to seeing a neutral one.3
Table I presents the results of a multivariate probit model of asset choice. The
dependent variable, StockChoicet, is equal to 1 if the subject chose to invest in the stock
on trial t, and 0 otherwise.
An important determinant of choice is the probability that the stock is paying from
the good dividend distribution. If our subjects are risk-neutral for the small stakes
involved in each asset choice, and maximize the expected value of the dividend to be
received at the end of each trial, they should only pick the stock if the probability that
it is the good one is at least 80%. When this condition is not met, the bond should be
chosen. We therefore include as an independent variable the objective, Bayesian value
of this probability based on the history of dividends paid up to and including the prior
trial (ObjectiveProbabilityt−1). The objective probability that the stock is good after
observing k dividend payments of $10 in the past n trials in the block (and thus (n− k)
dividend payments of -$10) is: Prob{GoodStock|k successes in n trials } = 1
1+3n−2k
.
Since the subjects’ posterior beliefs are not necessarily equal to the objective pos-
terior, we estimate the probit model also using these elicited subjective probabilities
(ProbabilityEstimatet−1), and also control for the confidence that subjects put in their
probability estimates (ConfidenceEstimatet−1).
Given the simple decision rule dictated by expected utility maximization, the proba-
bility of choosing the stock should only depend on whether the prior probability (objec-
3While negative pictures reduced risk taking in this study, in a prior experiment, positive pictures
increased risk taking (Knutson et al. (2008)). This difference may be due to the use of more potent
negative stimuli in the present experiment.
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tive or subjective) that the stock is good is greater than 80%. We find, however, that we
can explain significantly more variation in subjects’ choices if we allow the probability
of choosing the stock to be a linear function of prior beliefs, instead of being a step-
function. Hence, in interests of space, in the analysis reported here we use the better-fit
specification.
As independent variables for stock versus bond choice we also include picture type
(captured by dummies PositiveCuet and NegativeCuet, the omitted category being
the neutral pictures), a dummy indicating whether the dividend paid by the stock on
the prior trial was $10 (HighStockDividendt−1), and the past choice of the subject
(StockChoicet−1). All these variables relate to the affective state of the individual at the
time of choice, as indicated by prior neuroeconomics work.
To control for wealth and time effects on choice we include in the model the overall
earnings in the experiment up to that trial (TotalEarningst−1), and block number fixed-
effects. We include subject fixed effects to take into account the possibility that some
people are more risk seeking than others, and cluster the standard errors by subject.
The results in Table I indicate that subjects were 7% less likely to choose the risky
asset after the presentation of negative pictures, relative to the presentation of neutral
ones, especially if their prior choice was the bond. Positive pictures increased the like-
lihood that the stock was chosen by 6%, if the prior choice was the stock (this effect,
however, is only marginally significant).
Moreover, the dividend paid by the stock in the prior trial influenced the asset choice.
If the stock paid the high ($10) dividend in the prior trial, controlling for the subjective
belief that the stock was the good one, subjects were 11% more likely to switch from
holding the bond to holding the stock, relative to trials where the prior dividend was
low (-$10). Interestingly, the effect of the prior stock dividend on the current choice is
driven out of the model when the objective probability that the stock is good is used as
a control variable, instead of the subjective posterior.
As expected, the objective and subjective beliefs that the stock was good given the
dividend history were positive and significant predictors of StockChoicet. If subjects
estimated that the stock they faced had a higher probability of being the good stock (as
measured by ProbabilityEstimatet−1), they were more likely to select that stock in the
subsequent trial. Additionally, if subjects were more confident in their probability esti-
mate (as measured by ConfidenceEstimatet−1), their estimate was a stronger predictor
of choosing the stock in the next trial. The objective, Bayesian probability that the stock
is good (ObjectiveProbabilityt−1) also robustly predicted subsequent stock choice.
It is important to establish, though, that subjective beliefs influence choice on their
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own, and not simply because they may correlate with the objective belief. To check
whether this is the case, we estimate the probit model of stock choice by simultane-
ously including ProbabilityEstimatet−1 and ObjectiveProbabilityt−1 among the right-
hand side variables. As can be seen in Table I, the subjective probability estimate
continues to be a positive and significant predictor of choosing the stock, even when
controlling for the objective probability.
The results also show the existence of time and wealth effects. Subjects were less
likely to choose a stock in later blocks of the task (as indicated by the coefficients on the
block fixed-effects dummies, not reported here for space reasons). Also, especially after
a bond choice, individuals with more money earned on the task up to that point were
more likely to switch to the stock.
Hence, since the results in Table I indicate that affect-inducing stimuli change choices
even after controlling for beliefs, we infer that they must change risk preferences, with
negative affect leading to higher risk aversion and positive affect leading to more risk
seeking.
B. Affect and beliefs
We find that subjective beliefs tracked objective probabilities relatively well, indicat-
ing that subjects understood and paid attention to the task. Although subjects tended
to overestimate small probabilities and underestimate large probabilities, their estimates
closely approximated the correct values, as can be seen in Figure 4. Interestingly, how-
ever, the amount of confidence subjects had in their probability estimates was highest
for extreme low and high probabilities, as shown in Figure 5.
The multivariate regression4 results in Table II also show that the subjective be-
liefs (ProbabilityEstimatet) are highly positively correlated with the objective, Bayesian
posterior (ObjectiveProbabilityt). If the latter increases by 10%, the subjective poste-
rior increases by 6.1%. The difference between these two probabilities can come from
subjects using a different updating formula than Bayes’ rule, or can be caused by im-
perfect recall of past outcomes. The task design allows us to disentangle the learning
effect from the memory effect5, since the value of the Bayesian posterior that the stock
is good on trial t only depends on the value of the prior held in trial t − 1 and on the
stock dividend paid in trial t, and therefore can be obtained without having to recall
4As in all models estimated in the paper, here we include subject fixed effects and cluster the standard
errors by subject.
5Recent evidence indicates that affect may also impact memory formation, but the underlying mech-
anisms are not yet fully known.
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several past dividends.6 For any given belief elicited from the subject in the prior trial
(ProbabilityEstimatet−1), we can compute the correct Bayesian posterior using that
prior and the news about the dividend paid by the stock in the current trial t. We re-
fer to this variable as BayesianPosteriorUsingSubjectivePriort. As can be seen from
Table II, this quantity is also a positive and significant predictor of the actual posterior
belief declared by the subject. Its predictive power is greatest if subjects declared to
have high confidence in their probability estimates in trial t − 1, as would naturally be
expected.
However, since there is not a one-to-one mapping between the subjective and the
correct posteriors, Bayes’ rule is a only rough predictor of the way subjects update
beliefs, leaving room for other factors to impact learning.
While we do not find a significant impact of positive or negative pictures on the
probability estimates reported by subjects, we document that feedback about past choices
has effects on these subjective beliefs that are consistent with our predictions.
As Table II shows, relative to subjects who chose the bond in trial t, those individuals
who chose the stock (i.e. those for whom StockChoicet = 1) declare a probability
estimate that the stock is the good one that is about 10% higher. This effect is present
even after controlling for the objective belief that this is the good stock, or for the
Bayesian posterior formed using the subject’s own probability estimate elicited at the
end of the prior trial. As the probit model of stock choice in Table I indicates, subjects
select assets based on their priors. The results in Table II suggest that the fact that a
subject chose a particular asset will make that asset even more desirable to the person
after the choice, even when controlling for what the subject believed about the asset
right before he decided to add it to his portfolio.
This suggests that people may choose their beliefs strategically, to maintain positive
affect or avoid negative affect.7 All else equal, after learning the dividend paid by the
stock those individuals who chose the stock in the beginning of a particular trial will be
more optimistic that the stock is good, relative to people who chose the bond, in order
to validate their choice and feel good about it.
To further investigate the role of past choices on beliefs, we split the data based on
whether the stock or the bond were chosen in a given trial, and analyzed how subjects
in these two conditions updated their beliefs upon the arrival of the dividend news. For
6If the prior probability that that stock is good is p, then following a high ($10) dividend, the posterior
obtained using Bayes’ rule is 3p
2p+1
. The posterior after a low (-$10) dividend is p
3−2p
.
7Arguably, this can be seen an instance of the endowment effect, but in our task subjects were not
endowed with the stock or bond. They had to decide every trial which of the two assets they wanted to
hold, for that trial only.
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any prior belief expressed by the subject we calculated the correct Bayesian posterior,
and compared that to the posterior actually declared by the subject. Several patterns
emerge, as seen in Figure 6.
First, as also indicated by the results in Table II, stock holders provide higher posterior
estimates than bond holders, independent of their prior beliefs and the actual dividend
paid by the stock.
Second, the results in Figure 6 suggest that updating extreme priors (very low or very
high subjective probability estimates that the stock is good) is different from updating
moderate priors. There is a significant overreaction to news that oppose the extreme
prior. For example, if a subject believes that the probability the stock is good is low (less
than 20%), and then a high dividend is realized, he will form a much higher posterior
that this is the good stock than is warranted by the news. The elicited posterior is 22%
higher than it should be, as indicated by the summary statistics in Table III. If the
subject has an extreme high prior belief (greater than 80%) that the stock is good, and
then the stock pays a low dividend, the subjective posterior is 20% lower than what it
should be conditional on the prior, and on the new dividend (see Table III). All these
effects are statistically significant (p < 0.001).
Third, for moderate priors, subjective posterior beliefs are conservative. That is, the
information about the new dividend is not fully incorporated to generate a posterior
that matches that produced by Bayes’ rule when applied to the subject’s prior belief.
This can be a manifestation of the well-known conservatism bias (Phillips and Edwards
(1966)), whereby people do not update their prior beliefs enough when presented with
new information. Table IV presents the summary statistics for these errors in updating.
For stock holders and bond holders, the elicited posteriors are lower by 10% and 13%,
respectively, than the Bayesian posterior, if the stock pays a high dividend. If the stock
pays a low dividend, stock and bond holders do not revise down their priors enough.
Their elicited posterior probabilities are higher than they should be by 10% and 7%,
respectively. These effects are also statistically significant (p < 0.001).
Fourth, the results in Figure 6 indicate that this conservatism in updating is asymmet-
ric, in that it depends on the choice the subject made in the beginning of the trial. This
is a novel result and is not an implication of conservatism bias per se. Specifically, stock
holders especially ignore news about low dividends, and bond holders especially ignore
news about high dividends. This asymmetry is also supported by the evidence on the
size of the learning errors presented in Table IV as a function of asset choice and dividend
type. We formally test it by estimating an OLS regression where the dependent variable
is the absolute value of the learning error (|BayesianPosteriorUsingSubjectivePriort−
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ProbabilityEstimatet|), first for trials where the stock paid a low dividend, and then
for those where the the dividend was high. The independent variable of interest is the
dummy indicating whether in the beginning of the trial the subject chose the stock or not
(StockChoicet). We include subject fixed effects to take into account the possibility that
some people make larger size errors in updating than others, and cluster the standard
errors by subject. The results are presented in Table V. The size of the probability
updating error is 3% higher for stock holders than for bond holders if the dividend is
low, and it is 3% higher for bond holders relative to stock holders if the dividend is high.
These differences are statistically significant (p < 0.05).
This asymmetry is consistent with our hypothesis that subjects choose beliefs that
match their prior choices in order to avoid the negative affect caused by the admission
of making a mistake. Importantly, this effect is different from confirmation bias (Mynatt
et al. (1977)), which refers to people’s tendency to choose to consult information sources
that can help confirm a particular hypothesis, instead of seeking those that would help
reject it. People acting in accordance with confirmation bias simply have a preference for
how to explore information sources, but when they obtain explicit falsifying information,
they use it to reject incorrect hypotheses. In contrast to confirmation bias, our results
speak to an error in the process of rejecting incorrect hypotheses. Specifically, we show
that individuals underweight or ignore information that is in disagreement with their
past choice.
We also find that affect changes the confidence in one’s estimates, and not just the
probability estimates themselves. We report these effects in the OLS regression in Table
VI. Since the unconditional results in Figure 5 revealed a U-shaped relationship be-
tween confidence in one’s probability estimate and the probability itself, in the model
of confidence in Table VI we include as controls the subjective probability estimate and
its square (Panel A) and the objective probability and its square (Panel B). The model
includes subject fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by subject.
Confidence levels, declared using a scale from 1 to 9, are 0.17 higher (p < 0.07) in
trials where an exogenous positive picture was presented, relative to those where neutral
pictures were used. Negative cues are also positively associated with confidence, but
the effect is not statistically significant. In other words, exogenously-induced excitement
leads to more confidence in one’s probability estimation ability.
Moreover, confidence is significantly higher (by 0.2 to 0.7, depending on specification,
p < 0.01) in trials where the dividend paid by the stock matches the choice just made by
the subject, than in trials where it does not, as indicated by the positive coefficient on
the interaction term between HighStockDividendt and StockChoicet. These instances
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occur when the subject chooses the stock and then the dividend paid is high, or when
the bond is chosen and then the dividend paid is low. As discussed earlier, such events
are likely to be characterized by a state of endogenous positive affect, as the subject’s
choice is validated by the new dividend information.
Hence, the results indicate that positive affect induces the subjects to be more confi-
dent in their ability to identify the quality of the available risky investments.
IV. Discussion
The evidence presented here suggests that emotion impacts decision making under
risk. Affect may matter whether it is induced exogenously by an experimenter, a policy
maker, or by institutional features of markets and the environment in which the choice
is made, or whether it is generated by the outcomes of prior decisions. Positive affect
makes us more risk seeking, and more confident in our beliefs. To maintain positive affect
and avoid negative affect we ignore new information that is opposed to our actions, and
as a result, our learning is flawed. These findings have implications for several areas of
finance and economics.
A. Modeling learning
The learning model used in virtually all economic theories is Bayes’ rule. However, as
suggested by our results, and those in Charness and Levin (2005), exogenous factors and
outcomes of past choices may change the way people update their beliefs. We propose
that this influence is mediated by activation in the brain’s limbic system, in a predictable
and parsimonious way. Related to this idea is the work of Caplin and Dean (2008) on
the role of the neurotransmitter dopamine in economic choice. This neurotransmitter
is the source of activation in the nucleus accumbens, the brain’s reward area, and has
been shown to encode the prediction error generated by outcomes, which is defined as
the difference between the actual outcomes and their ex-ante expected value. Caplin
and Dean (2008) develop the axiomatic foundations of economic choice that would be
necessary for dopamine to indeed encode prediction errors. However, the approach in
that paper explicitly abstracts from a learning environment and thus does not provide a
model of belief updating per se.
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B. Incentives for exploration
Since affect induces errors in our learning process, the optimal contract offered by a
principal to an agent to induce efficient exploration of new strategies may need to take
emotions into account. For example, agents may ignore bad news about a new project
that they have chosen to start, in order to avoid experiencing negative affect. This error
in learning may not be there, for instance, if the news is perceived by the agent to only
speak to the quality of the project, but not to the quality of the agent himself. In general,
contracts should undo the agents’ tendency towards ignoring information that seems to
contradict their prior actions, as well as their tendency to be more confident in their
project selection abilities when the new information matches their prior choices.
C. Individual differences
Individuals vary in their reaction to affect cues. Some are influenced more by positive
cues in the environment, while others are affected more by negative cues, depending in
part on the reactivity of their limbic system. These effects are likely to work on chief
executive officers (CEOs) and other top corporate decision makers, just as on any other
individuals, and therefore may have a significant impact on firm value. We can speculate
that some CEOs might be likely to become overconfident after getting good news (which
may be unrelated to the firm’s operations) but not react as much to bad news. Other
CEOs might react more to bad news (again, perhaps orthogonal to the firm) relative to
good news.
Hence, firm policies regarding investment or capital structure may depend on the en-
vironment (i.e. the type of cues available to the top decision maker, such as information
about business conditions, or information unrelated to the firm) as well as on the person-
ality of the CEO, or their emotional reactivity. Prior studies have shown the importance
of CEO fixed-effects (Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Malmendier and Tate (2005)) on cor-
porate policies. Our work can shed light on what these fixed-effects capture. They might
provide a summary statistic of the CEO’s risk aversion, his sensitivity to gains and to
losses, or the responsivity of his beliefs to events that generate affect. Understanding the
importance of these components of CEO fixed-effects helps to optimally allocate man-
agers to firms, since these managerial personal characteristics influences the quality of
the CEO-firm match. One can envision equilibrium settings where firms with different
growth opportunities are optimally matched with managers with different levels of risk
aversion or different emotional reactivity to good or bad news. More broadly, our results
suggest that it is important for top corporate decision makers to be aware of the role of
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affect on financial choices, and of the types of information, or stimuli in the environment
that may change one’s affect and ultimately drive decisions that affect the entire firm.
D. Market and institutional design
Policy makers may wish to encourage people to save more for retirement by investing
more in the stock market, casino owners may want to have their visitors gamble more
money, and insurance companies may want to have their clients be more risk averse. All
these desired behaviors can be induced with the appropriate affective manipulation. For
instance, our results suggest that presenting ads, information or other types of stimuli
that induce a state of positive arousal will cause people to take more risk. In the context
of casinos, such institutional design features are already being employed. Visitors to
casinos floors are surrounded by sights of potential rewards, such as free food and drinks
offered by attractive individuals, that have nothing to do with the odds of winning at the
roulette table. As shown by prior research, the presence of these cues triggers the brain’s
reward area and induces a state of positive arousal. According to our results, this will
cause people to gamble more.
E. Asset bubbles and crashes
The relationship between affect and risk taking that we propose here suggests a pos-
sible explanation for asset bubbles and crashes. Positive returns in financial markets may
induce a positive affective state and make investors more willing to invest in stocks, and
more confident that they have chosen the right porfolio, which will lead to increased buy-
ing pressure and future positive returns. This effect would be even stronger when more
individuals are already investing in the stock market, since we show that simply adding
a risky asset to one’s portfolio makes people be more favorable about that asset’s future
payoffs. After losses in the financial markets, investors may experience a state of negative
affect which will reduce their willingness to take on more risk, and their confidence in
their ability to choose stocks. This will create selling pressure and further negative stock
returns. Such feedback effects can therefore lead to bubbles or crashes, depending on the
starting point in these chains of events.
V. Conclusion
Recent theories have proposed that emotion can influence decision making under risk,
and advances in technology enable experiments that can shed light on the mechanisms
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responsible for these effects. Here, we build on existing neuroeconomic evidence that
shows that the same brain areas that generate emotional states are also involved in the
processing of information about risk, rewards and punishments.
We examine whether emotion indeed influences risk taking, and whether it does so
by changing beliefs, preferences or both. In an investment selection task that requires
subjects to update their beliefs about the return distribution of a risky asset, we find
that events associated with positive and arousing emotions such as excitement lead to
riskier choices, while those associated with negative and arousing emotions such as anx-
iety lead to more risk averse choices. Moreover, affect influences the belief formation
process. Positive arousal increases the subjects’ confidence in their ability to evaluate
the risky investments they are faced with. Beliefs about these investments are updated in
a way that is consistent with the self-preservation motive of maintaining positive affect
and avoiding negative affect. Specifically, subjects do not fully incorporate news that
contradict their prior choices, and form incorrect posterior beliefs.
Several important caveats limit the implications of our experimental findings. First,
the effects documented here only speak directly to the influence of affect on fast deci-
sions in an experimental setting, whereas outside the laboratory people have much more
time to deliberate and make financial choices. Therefore, we can only speculate that our
results apply to real life financial decisions. Moreover, we propose here a framework for
understanding how affect changes risk preferences and beliefs that is based on neuro-
science evidence on how our brain works during the process of economic choice. We do
not, however, measure brain activation during our experiment, both because it is very
costly to acquire such data, and also, because in doing so we would only replicate existing
findings regarding activation patterns in the brain’s emotional areas. We therefore rely
on prior neuroeconomics findings to infer how the exogenous manipulations in the ex-
periment, and the endogenous outcomes of past choices influence the brain mechanisms
that we propose to be important in financial decision making.
These caveats notwithstanding, the evidence provided here suggests that characteris-
tics of markets, economic policies or organization design that have an impact on emotional
brain circuits may influence decision making under risk by changing both risk preferences,
and the learning process. A more realistic theory of learning needs to account for the
effects of emotions on beliefs. Reactivity to emotional events may be the source of in-
dividual differences observed in economic behavior, may be a factor to be considered in
optimal contracting problems, and may also help predict fluctuations in asset prices.
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Appendix A: Instructions for the Beliefs task
You will be able to make 90 investments in a risky asset (a stock) and in a riskless asset (a bond,
or a savings account). On any trial, if you choose to invest in the bond, you get $3 for sure at the end
of the trial. If you choose to invest in the stock, you will receive a dividend which can be either $10 or
-$10. The stock can either be good or bad, and this will determine the likelihood of its dividend being
high or low.
If the stock is good then the probability of receiving the $10 dividend is 75% and the probability of
receiving the -$10 dividend is 25%. The dividends paid by this stock are independent from trial to trial,
but come from this exact distribution. In other words, once it is determined by the computer that the
stock is good, then on each trial the odds of the dividend being $10 are 75%, and the odds of it being
-$10 are 25%.
If the stock is bad then the probability of receiving the $10 dividend is 25% and the probability of
receiving the -$10 dividend is 75%. The dividends paid by this stock are independent from trial to trial,
but come from this exact distribution. In other words, once it is determined by the computer that the
stock is bad, then on each trial the odds of the dividend being $10 are 25%, and the odds of it being
-$10 are 75%.
At the beginning of each block of 5 trials, you do not know which type of stock the computer selected
for that block. You may be facing the good stock, or the bad stock, with equal probability.
On each trial in the block you will decide whether you want to invest in the stock for that trial and
accumulate the dividend paid by the stock, or invest in the safe asset and add $3 to your task earnings.
You will then see the dividend paid by the stock, no matter if you chose the stock or the bond. After
that we will ask you to tell us two things:
(1) what you think is the probability that the stock is the good one (the answer must be a number
between 0 and 100 do not add the % sign, just type in the value)
(2) how much you trust your ability to come up with the correct probability estimate that the stock
is good. In other words, we want to know how confident you are that the probability you estimated is
correct. The answer is between 1 and 9, with 1 meaning you have the lowest amount of confidence in
your estimate, and 9 meaning you have the highest level of confidence in your ability to come up with
the right probability estimate.
There is always an objective, correct, probability that the stock is good, which depends on the
history of dividends paid by the stock already. For instance, at the beginning of each block of trials, the
probability that the stock is good is exactly 50%, and there is no doubt about this value.
As you observe the dividends paid by the stock you will update your belief whether or not the stock
is good. It may be that after a series of good dividends, you think the probability of the stock being good
is 75%. However, how much you trust your ability to calculate this probability could vary. Sometimes
you may not be too confident in the probability estimate you calculated and some times you may be
highly confident.
For instance, at the very beginning of each block, the probability of the stock being good is 50%
and you should be highly confident in this number because you are told that the computer just picked
at random the type of stock you will see in the block, and nothing else has happened since then.
Every time you provide us with a probability estimate that is within 5% of the correct value (e.g.
correct probability is 80% and you say 84% , or 75%) then we will add $1 to your task earnings at the
end of the task.
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Throughout the task you will be told how much you have accumulated through dividends paid by
the stock or bond you chose up to that point.
PAY: You final pay for being in our experiment will be: Show-up fee + 1/20 * Task Earnings, where
the Task Earnings = (Dividends you accumulate through investing in the two assets PLUS money you
earn by guessing correct probabilities). The show-up fee is $15.
PICTURES: During each trial you will see a geometric shape and a picture before you make the
investment decision for that trial. The shape and picture have no connection to the investment choice
you are facing. However, we would like you to pay attention to them because we will ask you questions
about them after the investment task is over.
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Figure 1
Trial structure of the Beliefs Task.
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Table I
Probit model for choosing the stock versus the bond
The dependent variable, StockChoicet, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subject chose to hold the stock in trial t, and 0 if the bond was chosen.
PositiveCuet and NegativeCuet are indicator variables equal to 1 if the exogenous visual cue presented at the beginning of the trial was a positive
or a negative one, respectively. HighStockDividendt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the dividend paid by the stock in trial t is $10, and zero if
the dividend is -$10. TotalEarningst is the total amount of money earned by the subject up to and including trial t. ProbabilityEstimatet is the
subjective probability that the stock is the good one, elicited at the end of trial t. ObjectiveProbabilityt is the Bayesian posterior belief that the stock
is good, conditional on the history of dividends paid by the stock up to and including trial t. ConfidenceEstimatet is the subjective confidence (1
through 9, with 1 being the lowest confidence) in the elicited posterior probability estimate that the stock is the good one. The table reports marginal
effects. Standard errors are clustered by subject (t-statistics are shown in parentheses).
Dependent variable Previous choice Previous choice
StockChoicet was the bond was the stock
(i.e. StockChoicet−1 = 0) (i.e. StockChoicet−1 = 1) All data
PositiveCuet –0.04 –0.04 –0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02
(–1.25) (–1.24) (–1.32) (1.90)∗ (1.78)∗ (1.55) (–0.62) (–0.68) (–0.66)
NegativeCuet –0.07 –0.07 –0.07 –0.06 –0.06 –0.07 –0.09 –0.09 –0.09
(–2.24)∗∗ (–2.15)∗∗ (–2.30)∗∗ (–1.03) (–1.13) (–1.21) (–2.08)∗∗ (–2.10)∗∗ (–2.23)∗∗
HighStockDividendt−1 0.02 0.01 0.11 –0.05 –0.07 0.05 0.00 –0.02 0.11
(0.45) (0.15) (2.99)∗∗∗ (–0.89) (–1.12) (0.84) (0.01) (–0.40) (2.13)∗∗
TotalEarningst−1 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
(2.68)∗∗∗ (2.78)∗∗∗ (3.08)∗∗∗ (1.38) (1.33) (1.23) (2.04)∗∗ (2.10)∗∗ (2.29)∗∗
ObjectiveProbabilityt−1 0.61 0.46 0.69 0.56 0.77 0.60
(7.12)∗∗∗ (5.12)∗∗∗ (4.59)∗∗∗ (3.79)∗∗∗ (6.23)∗∗∗ (5.06)∗∗∗
ProbabilityEstimatet−1 0.28 0.15 0.26 0.52 0.34 0.38
(3.54)∗∗∗ (0.91) (1.41) (2.29)∗∗ (2.56)∗∗ (2.14)∗∗
ConfidenceEstimatet−1 –0.03 –0.01 –0.03
(–2.13)∗∗ (–0.66) (–1.74)∗
ProbabilityEstimatet−1 X 0.06 0.01 0.05
X ConfidenceEstimatet−1 (2.41)
∗∗ (0.16) (1.41)
StockChoicet−1 0.16 0.14 0.17
(3.94)∗∗∗ (3.68)∗∗∗ (5.15)∗∗∗
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Block fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.263 0.275 0.246 0.244 0.249 0.225 0.307 0.315 0.291
Observations 1443 1443 1443 970 970 970 2413 2413 2413
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Table II
Elicited posterior probability estimates
The dependent variable, ProbabilityEstimatet, is the elicited, subjective posterior probability that
the stock is the good one. PositiveCuet and NegativeCuet are indicator variables equal to 1 if the
exogenous visual cue presented at the beginning of the trial was a positive or a negative one, re-
spectively. StockChoicet is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subject chose to hold the stock
in trial t, and 0 if the bond was chosen. ObjectiveProbabilityt is the Bayesian posterior belief that
the stock is good, conditional on the history of dividends paid by the stock up to and including trial
t. BayesianPosteriorUsingSubjectivePriort is the value of the posterior belief that the stock is good
obtained by updating the subject’s prior belief using the new dividend information according to Bayes’
rule. ConfidenceEstimatet is the subjective confidence (1 through 9, with 1 being the lowest confi-
dence) in the elicited posterior probability estimate that the stock is the good one. Standard errors are
clustered by subject (t-statistics are shown in parentheses).
Dependent Variable: Panel A Panel B Panel C
ProbabilityEstimatet
PositiveCuet .01 .01 .01
(.55) (.67) (.40)
NegativeCuet –.01 –.00 –.00
(–.81) (–.26) (–.35)
StockChoicet .07 .10 .09
(3.69)∗∗∗ (5.69)∗∗∗ (5.53)∗∗∗
ObjectiveProbabilityt .61
(11.59)∗∗∗
BayesianPosteriorUsingSubjectivePriort .62 .41
(12.48)∗∗∗ (4.87)∗∗∗
BayesianPosteriorUsingSubjectivePriort .03
x ConfidenceEstimatet−1 (3.09)
∗∗∗
ConfidenceEstimatet−1 –.02
(–3.67)∗∗∗
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 .585 .550 .558
Observations 2413 2413 2413
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Table III
Errors in updating extreme priors
The error in probability updating (BayesianPosteriorUsingSubjectivePriort−ProbabilityEstimatet)
as a function of the stock dividend, for extreme low (i.e. ProbabilityEstimatet−1 ∈ [0, 0.2]), extreme
high (i.e. ProbabilityEstimatet−1 ∈ [0.8, 1)) and moderate (i.e. ProbabilityEstimatet−1 ∈ (0.2, 0.8))
subjective prior beliefs. ∗∗∗ indicates that the estimate is significantly different than zero (p < 0.001).
StockDividendt = −$10 StockDividendt = $10
Extreme low subjective prior -0.06∗∗∗ -0.22 ∗∗∗
Moderate subjective prior -0.08∗∗∗ 0.11 ∗∗∗
Extreme high subjective prior 0.20∗∗∗ 0.10 ∗∗∗
Table IV
Conservatism bias
The error in probability updating (BayesianPosteriorUsingSubjectivePriort−ProbabilityEstimatet)
as a function of the subject’s choice and the stock dividend, for moderate subjective prior beliefs (i.e.
ProbabilityEstimatet−1 ∈ (0.2, 0.8)). StockChoicet is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subject
chose to hold the stock in trial t, and 0 if the bond was chosen. ∗∗∗ indicates that the estimate is
significantly different than zero (p < 0.001).
StockDividendt = −$10 StockDividendt = $10
StockChoicet = 0 -0.07
∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
StockChoicet = 1 -0.10
∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
Table V
Strategic belief formation
The dependent variable is the absolute value of the error in probability updating
(|BayesianPosteriorUsingSubjectivePriort − ProbabilityEstimatet|), for moderate subjective
prior beliefs (i.e. ProbabilityEstimatet−1 ∈ (0.2, 0.8)). StockChoicet is an indicator variable equal to
1 if the subject chose to hold the stock in trial t, and 0 if the bond was chosen. Standard errors are
clustered by subject (t-statistics are shown in parentheses).
Dependent Variable StockDividendt StockDividendt
|BayesianPosteriorUsing− = −$10 = $10
SubjectivePriort − ProbabilityEstimatet| Coef./t Coef./t
StockChoicet .03 –.03
(2.54)∗∗ (–2.61)∗∗
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes
Adj. R2 .219 .164
Observations 927 857
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Table VI
Subjective confidence estimates
The dependent variable, ConfidenceEstimatet, is the subjective confidence (1 through 9, with 1 being
the lowest confidence) in the elicited posterior probability estimate that the stock is the good one.
PositiveCuet and NegativeCuet are indicator variables equal to 1 if the exogenous visual cue presented
at the beginning of the trial was a positive or a negative one, respectively. HighStockDividendt is
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the dividend paid by the stock in trial t is $10, and zero if the
dividend is -$10. StockChoicet is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subject chose to hold the stock
in trial t, and 0 if the bond was chosen. ObjectiveProbabilityt is the Bayesian posterior belief that
the stock is good, conditional on the history of dividends paid by the stock up to and including trial
t. ProbabilityEstimatet is the subject’s estimate of the probability that the stock is the good one.
Standard errors are clustered by subject (t-statistics are shown in parentheses).
Dependent variable: Panel A Panel B
ConfidenceEstimatet
PositiveCuet .17 .18
(1.88)∗ (1.92)∗
NegativeCuet .13 .12
(1.67) (1.50)
HighStockDividendt−1 –.25 –.44
(–1.81)∗ (–2.65)∗∗
HighStockDividendt X StockChoicet .73 .74
(3.42)∗∗∗ (4.23)∗∗∗
StockChoicet –.37 –.51
(–2.52)∗∗ (–3.08)∗∗∗
ObjectiveProbabilityt –3.56
(–2.55)∗∗
ObjectiveProbability2
t
3.64
(2.57)∗∗
ProbabilityEstimatet –3.98
(–3.10)∗∗∗
ProbabilityEstimate2
t
4.83
(3.58)∗∗∗
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes
Adj. R2 .539 .548
Observations 2402 2402
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